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RECENT CASES
RECENT CASES
AiunoonmES--Co-.rauTOaY NEGLoEcE-Dury OF C~is.-Deceased was
killed while driving Ins auto on a very foggy night, by reason of running into
a house, which was being moved and wnch at the time of the accident was
occupying the whole of the street and was not properly equipped with marking
lights. Held. That the "drive within the radius of your lights" rule would not
be adopted in Washington, and that the rule to be followed in this state is
that the driver "must see any object which an ordinary prudent driver under
like circumstances would have seen." Morehouse v. Everett, 41 Wash. Dec. 303
Pac. (1927).
This case is a definite announcement of the rule to be followed in Wash-
ington, since the Court takes up the cases where the point had been discussed
before in this state and then finally refuses to follow what they admit to be the
weight of authority.
Seven states have decided that it is negligence per se to drive at such a
speed that the car can not be stopped in time to avoid an obstruction discern-
ible within the driver's vision ahead. Fisher v. O'Brien, 99 Kan. 6-1, 162 Pac.
317, L. R. A. 1917F, 610 (1917), Harnau v. Haight, 189 Mich. 600, 155 N. W
563 (1915), Solomon, v. Duncan, 194 Mo. App. 517, 185 S. W 1141 (1916)
Albertson v. Ansbacher 102 Misc. 5.7, 169 N. Y. S. 188 (1918) Webster v.
Pollock, 15 Ohio App. 102 (1921) West Constr. Co. v. White, 130 Tenn. 520,
179 S. W 301 (1914) Lauson v. Fond du Lac, 141 Wis. 57, 123 N. W 629, 25
L. R. A. (N. S.) 40 (1909). Tls same result was reached in the Washington
case of Ebling v. Nielseon, 109 Wash. 355, 186 Pac. 887 (1920), but the part of
the decision stating this principle was later withdrawn by the Court sitting
en bane. Ebling v. Nielsen, 113 Wash. 698, 193 Pac. 569 (1920). Therefore
Washington cannot now be quoted as upholding the rule for which it is cited
in a note in 44 L. R. A. 1397. See also Devoto v. United Auto Transportation
Co., 128 Wash. 604, 223 Pac. 1050 (1924). The decision in the latter case and
in the principal case seems to be influenced by the fact that there is consider-
able fog at times in Washington, and in many cases the fog is so thick that the
driver can not see ahead at all. If the rule of "drive within the radius of your
lights" were applied in such case, the driver would be forced to stop and that
would tend to retard and in many cases to stop traffic entirely. Therefore the
rule is that the driver should be allowed to proceed in a careful and prudent
manner, and whether he does so will be a question for the jury. The rule
announced in the principal case has been adopted in the state of Oregon, Mur-
phy v. Hawthorne, 117 Ore. 319, 244 Pac. 79 (1926) using a very similar line of
argument, as it has also been adopted in the state of Iowa. Owens v. Iowa
County, 186 Iowa 408, 169 N. W 388 (1918). See 44 L. R. A. 1397 for a collec-
tion of the cases upon this point. C. P
ATurOBILEs-NEGL1ExcE-DuTY oF DRiVEa OF AuToxoiL.Defendants
were driving east on paved street forty feet wide and devoid of traffic at
rate of ten to twelve miles per hour in daytime. Plaintiff's son, aged eight
years, was proceeding west close to the northerly curb of street in a coaster
wagon, and attempted to cross in a diagonal direction towards opposite side
of the street. The boy was struck by defendant's auto and injured. De-
fendant testified that he did not see child until from three to five feet from
the automobile. Held: (reversing a judgment of nonsuit in an action tried
before the court without a jury) "it was the duty of the driver of the auto
to have seen the boy and his wagon as they were running along close to the
northerly curb, and particularly should he have seen im when he turned from
the curb and went diagonally across the street in front of the auto he
was bound to know that a child of the age of this one might undertake to
cross the street in front of him" Pritchard v. Hockett, 40 Wash. Dec. 380,
249 Pac. 989 (1926).
It will be noted that this decision seems to place an absolute duty upon
the driver of an automobile and to leave no longer open the question as to
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whether the driver.exercising the care of an ordinary prudent man under the
same or similar circumstances would have seen the person attempting to cross
in front of his automobile, which has been the rule heretofore in this state.
Minor v. Stevens, 65 Wash. 423, 118 Pac. 313 (1911). All doubt as to the far-
reaching effect of this decision would be removed had the case been tried by
a jury and had the Court held the plaintiff guilty of negligence as a matter
of law, without requiring the issue to be submitted to the jury as a question
of fact. Such a holding, however, would seem to be in accord with the weight
of authority on this question. Smith v. Coon, 89 Neb. 776, 132 N. W 535
(1911) Burvant v. Wolfe, 126 La. 787, 52 So. 1025 (1910) Diamond v.
Cowles, 174 Fed. 571 (C. C. A. 3d, 1909) Kessler v. Washburn, 157 Ill. App.
532 (1910). The operation of an automobile upon a city street necessitates
great care on the part of the driver. Lampe v. Jacobsen, 46 Wash. 533, 90
Pac. 654 (1907). The driver of an automobile is bound to anticipate that other
travelers, both in carriage and on foot, will use the highway, and hence it is
his duty to have his machine under reasonable control so as to avoid injury
to such travelers. Deitchler v. Ball, 99 Wash. 483, 170 Pac. 123 (1918) Locke
v. Green, 100 Wash. 397, 171 Pac. 245 (1918). A driver is bound to see
persons in the street ahead of him when his view is unobstructed. Warner v.
Bertholf 40 Cal. App. 776, 181 Pac. 808 (1919) Russell v. Scharfe, 76 Ind.
App. 191, 130 N. E. 437 (1921). As to children, a greater amount of care is
required than in the case of a grown person. Blair v. Kilbourne, 121 Wash.
93, 207 Pac. 953 (1922). The reason underlying the requirement of a greater
amount of care upon the part of an automobile driver is based upon the
theory of a dangerous instrumentality. Minor v. Stevens, 65 Wash. 423, 118
Pac. 313, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1178, 2 N. C. C. A. 309 (1911). G. E. C.
BANKS AND BANKING-LEr3a OF CREDIT--RIGHTS OF ISSUING BANK WHEN
GooDs AaE DEFEcTiv. The plaintiff bank at the request of S., a buyer under
a sales contract, issued an irrevocable letter of credit in favor of the defend-
ant, the seller. The letter of credit consisted of a promise to honor drafts
"covering a shipment of steel products" when accompanied by specified ship-
ping documents. The defendants, in due time, presented the drafts, accom-
panied by the necessary documents in proper form; whereupon the drafts
were paid by the plaintiff bank. S. was unable to take up the drafts and the
plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant to recover the amount of
the drafts. It was alleged in the complaint that the goods delivered by the
defendant were not of the kind and quality specified in the sales contract, and
were of much less value than the goods contracted for. The defendant's de-
murrer to the complaint was sustained. Held. The demurrer was properly
sustained. Bank of East Asia v. Pang, 40 Wash. Dec. 433, 249 Pac. 1060
(1926).
No obligation to honor the draft rests upon the bank unless the accom-
panying documents strictly comply with the requirements of the letter of
credit. Lamborn v. Lake Shore Banking 8 Trust Co., 188 N. Y. S. 162 (App.
Div. 1921) affirmed 231 N. Y. 616, 132 N. E. 911 (1922) National City Bank
v. Seattle National Bank, 121 Wash. 476, 209 Pac. 705, 30 A. L. R. 347 (1922)
Moss v. Old Colony Trust Co., 246 Mass. 139, 140 N. E. 803 (1923) Old Colony
Trust Co. v. Lawyers' Title Trust Co., 297 Fed. 152 (C. C. A. 2d, 1994).
If the bank does honor the draft, despite the fact that the shipping documents
are not in conformity with the requirements of the letter of credit, it cannot
recover from the customer, the buyer, in case the goods are defective. Bank
of Montreal v. Recknagel, 109 N. Y. 482, 17 N. E. 217 (1888). If the docu-
ments on their face comply with the conditions of the letter of credit, then as
between the bank and the buyer, the bank is protected in honoring the draft
Benecke v. Haebler 58 N. Y. S. 16 (1899) affirmed 166 N. Y. 631, 60 N. B.
1107 (1901) Frey Son v. E. R. Sherburne Co., 181 N. Y. S. 661 (App. Div.
1920) Tocco v. Rinando, 248 Mass. 244, 143 N. E. 905 (1924) International
Banking Corp. v. Irving National Bank, 283 Fed. 103 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922). Nor
does any obligation rest upon the bank to investigate a claim by the buyer
that the goods delivered do not comply with the terms of the sales contract.
Laudiss v. American Exch. Nat. Bank, 239 N. Y. 234, 146 N. E. 347 (1924)
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First Wiscon Nat. Bank v. Forsyth Leather Co., 206 N. W (Wis.) 843
(1926). The most difficult situation arises where the bank itself asserts as a
defense to an action by the seller, or as the basis of an action against the
seller, as in the principal case, that the goods delivered are defective. As
between the bank and innocent tird persons this defense is clearly not avail-
able. Bank of Plant City v. Canal-Commercal T. c S. Bank, 270 Fed. 477
(C. C. A. 5th, 19.1). In accord with the holding of the instant case, that even
as between the bank and the seller, the bank "deals only in documents" and is
not concerned with any of the conditions of the sales contract, see O'Meara V.
National Park Bank, 239 N. Y. 386, 146 N. E. 636 (1925), Imbrze v. Nagase
e Co., 187 N. Y. S. 692 (App. Div. 1921). A contrary result was reached in
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Lawyers' Title k Trust Co., surpra, (holding that the
bank need not pay the draft, where although the warehouse receipt tendered
by the seller was valid on its face, the goods had not in fact been stored). It
would seem to be the business understanding of both parties, that the bank
relies not alone upon the credit of the buyer for security but also upon the
goods themselves. This being true, those conditions of the sales contract
relating to value, such as quality or quantity, might well be held to be implied
conditions of the letter of credit contract. The result of the principal case,
however, works no undue hardship upon the bank, as it may protect itself by
writing into the letter of credit such express conditions as it sees fit. For an
excellent discussion of the legal rights and liabilities incident to letters of
credit, see W E. McCurdy, Commerczal Letters of Credit, 35 HAiv. L. Rzv.
539, 715. B. B.
BunDING CoTiRACTs-ErFEcT OF DEATH ON NECESSITY OF ParFOaMAWCE.--
The intestate during his life time was a building contractor and at the time of
Ins death had partly completed two buildings which were completed by intes-
tate's administrator. P, a creditor of the estate, objected to the entry of the
final account and order of distribution presented by the administrator on the
ground that the administrator had no authority to complete the two contracts
since such contracts were personal and were terminated by the death of the
contractor. Held: The general rule is that it is the duty of an adimstrator
to perform the contracts of his intestate unless the acts to be performed are
personal. Ordinarily a building contract is not to be brought within that
class of contracts which are deemed to have been entered into because of the
skill or taste of the person required to perform it. Hence the personal repre-
sentative not only may, but is bound to, complete such a contract. In re
Burke's Estate, 198 Cal. 163, 244 Pac. 340, 44 A. L. R. 1341 (1926).
The same doctrine has been laid down by the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington in the case of MacDonald v. O'Shea, 58 Wash. 169, 108 Pac. 436, Ann.
Cas. 1912A, 417 (1910), where, however, the testator had covenanted for him-
self, Ins executors and admimstrators to perform the covenants of a building
contract. The Court said: "There was nothing in the contractual relationship
existing between the deceased and the Standard Furniture House at all ap-
proaching the relation of master and servant; nor was it contemplated that
the building, or any part thereof, when completed, should be the product of
his own personal labor and skill, either as a laborer, mechanic or artist. He
no doubt expected to perform his contract through the labor and skill of others,
to a large extent, and he had the right to so perform the whole of Ins contract
if he so desired. We have not had our attention called to any authorities
holding that the obligation of an independent contractor under an agreement
to build a building does not survive im, if the contract is not performed at
thp time of his death; while there is eminent authority to the contrary."
Lord Coke in 1615 in the case of Quick v. Ludborrow, 81 Eng. Reprint 25
(1688), said: "If a man be bound to build a house for another before such a
time, and he which is bound dies before the time, his executors are bound to
perform them." See Bambrick v. Webster Groves Presby. Church Ass/n, 53
Mo. App. _25 (1893), Chamberlain v. Dunlop, 126 N. Y. 45, 92 Aim St. Rep.
807 (1891), Jann v. Browne, 59 Cal. 37 (1881), Husheon v. Kelley, 162 Cal.
656, 14 Pac. 231 (1912).
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In almost all of the cases discussed and cited above the courts have said
obiter that if a contractor was selected to construct a building because of his
personal ability and skill that such a contract would be considered personal
and would be terminated by his death. There do not seem to be, however any
cases which have directly so held and unless the contract expressly provided for
the personal attention of the party contracting to erect a building the courts
would probably be reluctant so to hold not only in the light of the prior deci-
sions but also in view of the situation in which the parties to such a contract
would find themselves by virtue of such a holding. R. S. S.
CowTaAcs-REscsso-LAcHEs.-Plaintiff who lived in Wisconsin pur-
chased a note and mortgage on real estate in Seattle from the defendant.
Plaintiff believed that the mortgage covered improved property free and clear
of all encumbrances, having been led to such belief by defendant's fraudulent
misrepresentations. The land was in fact vacant, a fact wich plaintiff learned
about a year after the sale. Several months later she ascertained that unpaid
local assessments and taxes were a lien against the realty. A month thereafter,
June, plaintiff made repeated efforts to collect interest which was unpaid. She
continued these efforts ineffectually until September when threat of foreclosure
was made. Nothing was then done until December when the action of rescission
for fraud was brought and, though allowed in the lower court, was not allowed
on appeal, the Supreme Court holding: Plaintiff is barred by laches, the
right to rescind for fraud being waived where action was not begun until ten
months after discovery of the fraud, and only after repeated efforts to collect
were unavailing and abandoned. Kellner v. Rowe, 137 Wash. 418, 242 Pac. 353
(1926).
Where one with knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud unreason-
ably delays bringing his action for rescission, the court will infer that he has
waived the fraud at some time during the delay and elected to stand on the
voidable contract. McEvoy v. I.. Samuel Sons, 121 Atl. (Pa.) 189 (1923).
By inferring a waiver and election the court must presume an intent and
though such is at best but a presumption, yet by denying him the right to prove
his actual intent, the presumption is made conclusive. It is to be noted in the
principal case that the relative positions of the parties had not changed adverse-
ly to the party sought to be charged. L-indblom v. Johnson, 92 Wash. 171, 158
Pac. 972 (1916). The general rule in regard to laches as a bar to the action of
rescission for fraud is that one must delay with knowledge of the essential facts
of the fraud. Simon v. Goodyear Metallic Shoe Co., 105 Fed. 573, 44 C. C. A.
612 (1900) Bach v. Tuck, 26 N. E. (N. Y.) 1019 (1891) Richardson v. Lowe,
149 Fed. 625 (C. C. A. 8th, 1906). Moreover, the weight of authority favors the
view that one is held to such knowledge if he has such means of finding out as
he is bound to avail himself of. Capital Security Co. v. Davis, 60 So. (Ala.) 498
(1912) Garstang v. Skinner 134 Pac. (Cal.) 329 (1913) Geo. Pac. Ry. Co. V.
Brooks, 6 So. (Miss.) 467 (1889) Whitney v. Bissell, 146 Pac. (Ore.) 141
(1915) Coffman v. Viquesney, 84 S. R. (W Va.) 1069 (1915) Redgrave v.
Hurd, 20 Ch. Div. (Eng.) 1, McNair v. Sockriter 201 N. W (Ia.) 102 (1924)
Scott v. Empire Land Co., 5 F (2d) 873 (1925) Hogan v. Ross, 205 N. W
(Ia.) 208 (1925) Barr v. McCauley, 240 S. W (Tex.) 961 (1922). For cases
holding actual knowledge alone can be the basis of laches, see Hall v. Bank of
Baldwin, 127 N. W (Wis.) 969 (1910) Baker v. Lever 67 N. Y. 304 (1876)
Slaybach v. Raymond, 87 N. Y. S. 931 (1904). It has been held that a well
founded suspicion of the fraud would justify bringing the action. Cunning-
ham v. Pettigrew, 169 Fed. 335 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909). A person having knowl-
edge of the fraud must bring his action for rescission within a reasonable time
or as many courts put it, "with reasonable promptness." Blake v. Merritt, 101
Wash. 56, 171 Pac. 1013 (1918). This promptness is that which a man of ordi-
nary prudence would exercise under the same or similar circumstances. Fail-
ure to bring the action within a reasonable time after knowledge constitutes the
defense of laches (1) when some intervening change in the condition or rela-
tion of the parties adversely affecting the rights of the person sought to be
charged takes place. Lindblom v. Johnson, 92 Wash. 171, 158 Pac. 972 (1916)
Knuckolls v. Lea, 29 Humph. (Tenn.) 577 (1850) Monast v. Manhattan Life
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Ins. Co., 79 AtU. (R. I.) 932 (1911) Plyvipton v. Dunn, 20 N. E. (Mass.) 180
(1889), O'Neale v. Moore, 88 S. E. (W Va.) 1044 (1916). Or where the rights
of third parties have intervened raising new rights and obligations because of
the delay. Monast v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 79 Atl. (R. I.) 932 (1911), Dun-
fee v. Childs, 59 W Va. 225, 53 S. E. 209 (1906). (2) If plaintiff has done
any act during the period of delay inconsistent with an intention to rescind.
Dill v. Camp, 22 Ala. 249 (1853). (3) If an intention to waive the fraud may
be inferred from such delay. McEvoy -a. M. Samuel k Sons, 121 AUt. (Pa.) 189
(1923), Auto Finance Co. v. Rosenheim, 13 Pa. Super. Ct. 54.6 (1920). (4) If
an election to treat the contract as valid instead of voidable may be inferred
from the delay. Davis v. Louisville Trust Co., 181 Fed. 10, 104 C. C. A. 24
(1910), Blank v. Aronson, 187 Fed. 241, 109 C. C. A. 397 (1911) Richardson
v. Lowe, 149 Fed. 625, 79 C. C. A. 317 (1906). Subdivisions (3) and (4) supra
are practically the same in basis and result; however, most courts seem inclined
to demand more unreasonable delay to establish waiver than election. Well
reasoned cases may be found which support the doctrine laid down In 9 BLArc
oN Rzscissio2r, §§ 546,547, that is: To entitle one to rescind he is only required
to act with reasonable promptness, and a liberal extension of the rule is allowed
when the delay has not been willful nor exercised for an improper motive,
Prescott-Phoenix Oil k Gas Co. v. Gilliland Oil Co., 941 S. W (Tex.) 775
(192-) and there is no inequity in enforcing rescission, founded upon some
change in the condition or relations to the property of the parties. Galliher v.
Cadwell, 145 U. S. 368, 12 Sup. Ct. 873, 36 L. ed. 738 (1891). T. M. G.
CiiNAL LAw-JuaY-Tasmn.-The jury in a criminal case not having
reported a verdict, the judge caused the jury to be brought into court, and
inquired how it was divided numerically, though not in whose favor the ma-
jority stood. Held. This was reversible error. Bras/leld v. United Statnes,
- U. S. - , 71 L. ed. - , 47 Sup. Ct. 135 (1926).
The practice of making such inquiry, particularly when it is followed by
an instruction emphasizing the duty of the jury to reach a verdict, was con-
demned in the United States v. Burton, 196 U. S. 283, 25 Sup. Ct. 23, 49 L.
ed. 482 (1905). But the judgment was reversed on another ground, so that
it has not been understood whether the Court actually should grant a new
trial for such a cause. The inquiry in the Burton case was followed by a
charge which standing alone would have been considered jiistifiable, Allis v.
United States, 155 U. S. 117, 15 Sup. Ct. 36, 39 L. ed. 91 (1894) Allen v.
United States, 164 U. S. 492, 17 Sup. Ct. 154, 41 L. ed. 528 (1896), but the
two together were regarded as having a tendency to coerce the minority jurors.
The two elements seem to have concurred in St. Louis S. P Co. v. Bishard,
147 Fed. 496 (C. C. A. 8th, 1906), a civil case which was reversed for that
reason. The same was true in Stewart v. United States, S00 Fed. 769 (C. C. A.
8th, 1924), and Nigro v. United States, 4 F (d) 781 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925),
where the same result was reached.
In Bernal v. United States, 241 Fed. 339 (C. C. A. 5th, 1917), and Quong
Duch v. United States, 293 Fed. 563 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923), it was considered
not necessarily ground for a new trial. The comparatively few cases from
the state courts seem to take the same view. Eady v. State, 168 Ark. 731, 271
S. W 338 (1925) Evans v. State, 165 Ark. 424, 264 S. W 933 (1924), and
cases there cited; Flahive v. State, 10 Ga. App. 401, 73 S. E. 536 (1912). In
Murchison v. State, 153 Ark. 300, 240 S. W 402 (1922), the practice is justified
as enabling the court to determine intelligently the prospect of a verdict, and
accordingly to know whether or not to discharge the jury. See also State V.
Finch, 71 Kan. 795, 81 Pac. 494 (1905).
It is a singular circumstance that so few decisions on the specific point
are to be found, but this is probably to be explained on the ground that most
courts have considered in each case whether or not-all the circumstances to-
gether did in fact constitute improper influence by the court upon the jury.
Such was the view taken in Lindstrom v. Seattle Taxi Co., 116 Wash. 307, 199
Pac. 289 (19-1), a civil case in which the inquiry was said not to be com-
mended, but was not considered to warrant a reversal. The principal case,
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however, seems to fix the rule in the federal courts, that any such inquiry is of
itself erroneous and the basis for a new trial. 0. B. K.
CRIMINAL LAw-Pu-ISHMENT OF SUBSEQUENXT OFFENSEs-HABITUAL CRmI-
INAL.-Following the verdict of the jury, convicting petitioner of felony, but
prior to sentence, the prosecuting attorney filed an information charging the
petitioner with being an habitual criminal. Petitioner sued out writ of pro-
hibition to prevent his being tried on this charge, the contention being that at
time of filing information in last conviction, the prosecuting attorney should
have averred in such information that he was an habitual criminal and that a
conviction would be sought on this charge. Held. (Parker, J., dissenting)
There being no statutory provision applicable, no constitutional right is demed
by the procedure herein since the allegation of the prior conviction in the
information or indictment and proof thereof, would so prejudice the jury that
the accused would be denied the right to a fair trial. State ex rel. Edelstein
v. Huneke, J., 40 Wash. Dec. 289, 249 Pac. 784 (1926).
The opinion of the majority of the Court seems to be against the great
weight of authority- and the Court says in the principal case: "An exhaustive
review fails to disclose a single case where the fact of a second conviction was
sought to be determined by indictment regularly found at the close of a trial
upon a felony charge and before valid sentence was passed, as was done in
this case." In states where the statute imposes a greater punishment for a sec-
ond offense than for the first, the fact that the offense charged is a second
violation must be alleged in the indictment. Notes, 9 Ann. Cas. 768; 22 Ann. Cas.
1000. Where the statute imposes an additional penalty for repeated convic-
tions, the indictment for a subsequent offense must allege such prior convic-
tions. People v. King, 64 Cal. 338, 30 Pac. 1028 (1883) Watson v. People, 134
Ill. 374,, 25 N. E. 567 (1890) Commonwealth v. Walker 163 Mass. 226, 39
N. IE. 1014 (1895) Bandy v. Hehn, 10 Wyo. 167, 67 Pac. 979 (1902) Evans
v. State, 150 Ind. 651, 50 N. E. 820 (1898) 31 C. J. 734. The cases generally
hold that the former convictions must be alleged in the indictment. A different
rule apparently prevails in South Carolina, where it is controlled by statute.
State v. Kelly, 89 S. C. 303, 71 S. E. 987 (1911) State v. Parrs, 89 S. C.
140, 71 S. E. 808 (1911). The authorities cited by the majority opinion in the
main case do not seem to sustain the Court. The only authority to substan-
tiate the Court's decision lies in the fact that it has been the custom to follow
the procedure as herein followed since the Act of 1903, Rem. & Bal. Code
§ 2178, although subsequently repealed in 1909. In the final analysis the Court
rests its opinion upon the fact that this procedure adopted by the majority
opinion is consonant with the legislative intent at the only time such intent
was expressed, and the rule followed in this case protects every right of the
petitioner. G. F A.
DIvoRcE - CUSTODY OF CHILDREN - GROUNDS FOR AwaDm.- The plaintiff
brought action for divorce from her husband. The defendant answered and
by cross-complaint sought a divorce as against the plaintiff. An interlocutory
decree of divorce was granted in favor of the cross-complainant and against
the plaintiff. The custody of two girls, aged three and eight years, was
awarded to the parents of the husband. The plaintiff appealed from the
judgment awarding the custody of the children. Held. Before children of
the tender age of those here to be considered are to be taken from the mother
and given to others, it should be shown clearly that the mother is an unfit and
improper person to be intrusted with their custody. Prothero v. Prothero,
137 Wash. 34.9, 242 Pac. 1 (1926).
At common law the father was entitled to the custody and control of his
minor children, this right being accorded him because of his obligation to main-
tain, protect and educate them. Ex parte Boaz, 31 Ala. 425 (1858) McShan
v. McShan, 56 Miss. 413 (1879) People ex rel. Snell v. Snell, 77 Misc. Rep.
538, 137 N. Y. S. 193 (1912) Denny v. Denny, 118 Va. 79, 86 S. E. 835 (1915),
9 R. C. L. 471. The mother's right was secondary to that of the father, but
upon his death, or sometimes upon a showing of his incompetency, the rights
of the mother were recognized as being prior to those of all others. People
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v. Wilcox, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 178 (1854), Cowls v. Cowls, 3 Gilman (ILL.) 435,
44 Am. Dec. 708 (1846), In re Linder's Estate, 13 Cal. App. 208, 109 Pac. 101
(1910) Brackett v. Brackett, 77 N. H. 75, 87 Atl. 259 (1913).
Gradually, considering the statutes and the discretionary powers of the
court, it has come to be the generally recognized rule that the welfare of the
child is the cluef consideration in controversies of this kind and the court
must exercise a judicial discretion. Beyerle v. Beyerle, 155 Cal. 266, 100 Pac.
702 (1909) Cohn v. Scott, 931 Il. 556, 83 N. E. 191, 191 Am. St. Rep. 342
(1907), Colson v. Colson, 153 Ky. 68, 154 S. W 380 (1913), Wandersee v. Wan-
dersee, 132 Minn. 321, 156 N. W 348 (1916) Chamberlin v. Chamberlin, 194
App. Div. 470, 185 N. Y. S. 98 (1920), 9 R. C. L. 475; Note, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.)
565; KEzzEi: MAaHIAGE nD DivoRCE, (2d ed. 1923), § 589. With this doctrine
the decisions of Washington are in accord. Kentzler v. Kentzler 3 Wash. 166,
98 Pac. 370, 28 Am. St. Rep. 91 (1891), Carey v. Hertel, 37 Wash. 27, 79 Pac.
482 (1905), Kane v. Miller, 40 Wash. 125, 82 Pac. 177 (1905), Pierce v. Pierce,
52. Wash. 679, 101 Pac. 358 (1909), Wingard v. Wingard, 56 Wash. 354, 105
Pac. 833 (1909) Sorge v. Sorge, 112 Wash. 131, 191 Pac. 817 (1920), Ericson
v. Ericson, 114 Wash. 485, 195 Pac. 934 (1921). Under most modern statutes,
and in Washington under Rem Comp. Stat. § 6907, P C. § 1423, the father
and mother, if not unsuitable, are equally entitled to the custody of the chil-
dren. Newby v. Newby, 55 Cal. App. 114, 202 Pac. 891 (1921), Spratt v.
Spratt, 151 Minn. 458, 185 N. W 509 (1921), Delle v. Delle, 112 Wash. 512,
192 Pac. 966 (1920), KEEZER: MAMirAGE AN- DivoncE, (2d ed. 1923), § 587.
And the court may, in its judicial discretion, award their custody to either,
or to tird persons, as may seem best for the welfare of the children. Keesling
v. Keesling, 49 Ind. App. 361, 85 N. E. 837 (1908), Collins v. Collins, 76 Kan.
93, 90 Pac. 809 (1907), Shalloross v. Shallcross, 135 Ky. 418, 122 S. W 223
(1909), Sorge v. Sorge, 112 Wash. 131, 191 Pac. 817 (1920), Note, 41 L. IL A.
(N. S.) 568. The parental right, however, is recognized as prior, and children
will not be taken from their parents and given to others merely because they
are better provided financially to rear and educate them. Curtis v. Curtis, 46
Wash. 664, 91 Pac. 188 (1907), Lovell v. House of The Good Shepherd, 9
Wash. 419, 37 Pac. 660 (1894), Buchanan v. Buchanan, 93 Kan. 613, 144 Pac.
840 (1914), Ex Parte Livingston, 151 App. Div. 1, 135 N. Y. S. 328 (1912).
The mother is usually given the custody of children of tender years, if
otherwise fit and competent to care for them, upon the theory that such a
child needs a mother's care, and its welfare will be thus furthered. Mefert v.
Meffert, 118 Ark. 582, 177 S. W 1 (1915), Riggins v. Biggins, 191 Ky. 22, 228
S. W 1030 (1921), Jenkins v. Jenkins, 173 Wis. 592, 181 N. W 826 (1921),
Smith v. Smith, 15 Wash. 237, 46 Pac. .34 (1896), Freeland v. Freeland, 92
Wash. 482, 159 Pac. 698 (1916), Smith v. Frates, 107 Wash. 13, 180 Pac. 880
(1919), KEEZER: MAIRIAGE AwD DivoicE, (2d ed. 1923), p. 408. It is from this
fact that the statement in the principal case probably derives its root. While
the beneficial influences of a mother's care to such a child is perhaps recognized
as giving her preference, everything else being equal, the real determining
factor is the interest and welfare of the child and not any right that may
inhere in the mother. G. W McC.
IxsunA cE-CnAxGE OF BENEFrCIRY-MUTUAL BENEFIT SocIE-I-s.-Cer-
tificate originally named the father of insured as beneficiary. The father pre-
deceased the insured and the insured, in his last sickness, attempted to designate
Is brother as the new beneficiary. An application was made out in due form
and in compliance with the certificate of insurance and by-laws of the society,
but was not sent to the insurance society until after the death of the insured.
The certificate of insurance provided that notice of change of beneficiary must
be received and entered on the books of the company to be effective and in case
the insured died with no named beneficiary the proceeds of the policy would be
distributed according to the by-laws of the society. Held. The change of
beneficiary was effective on the ground that a court of equity would regard
that as done which ought to have been done. Also, that since the first benefi-
ciary was dead, the original designation of beneficiary was revoked, and the
contract could then be treated as if no designation had been made, and there-
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fore the appointment of the plaintiff was a "designation" and not a "change of
beneficiary" and not controlled by the regulations relied upon by the defendant.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Engznemen v. Ginther 248 Pac.
(Wyo.) 852 (1926).
Beneficiaries under a mutual benefit certificate have no vested interest
until the member's death. Longer v. Garter 102 Ark. 70, 143 S. W 575 (1912).
Therefore the first ground for the holding may be supported on the basis of
similar decisions. Supreme Conclave v. Cappella et al., 41 Fed. 1 (1890)
Arnold v. Newcomb, 104 Ohio St. 578, 136 N. E. 206 (1922) McGowan v.
Supreme Ct. Independent Order of Foresters, 104! Wis. 173, 80 N. W 603
(1899). The argument used here is that when the insured has done all on his
part that is necessary to work a change of beneficiary, that which the insur-
ance company must do is purely ministerial, since the insurance company re
serves no right of veto, and the regulations are merely as to the manner of
making the change and to provide for notice thereof to the society so that tb
fact may be made a matter of record. The courts are not in accord on the
proposition above stated. See Heydorf v. Conrack, 7 Kan. App. 202, 52 Pa"
700 (1898) Abbott v. Supreme Colony, etc. Pilgrim Fathers, 190 Mass. 67, 76
N. E. 234 (1906). Even the courts which allow recovery on facts such as above
require that there must be a valid and bona fide attempt to comply with the
rules and by-laws of the society. Vanasek v. Western Bohemian Fraternal
Ass'n, 102 Minn. 273, 142 N. W 333, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 141, Ann. Cas. 1914D,
1123 (1913).
The second ground for the holding in the principal case seems novel and
strictly, unnecessary to the decision of the case. However, it is more than
mere dictum since the Court purports to decide the case upon this point. The
Court based its decision on a case similarly decided in Illinois. Quest v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 230 Ill. App. 321 (1923).
It is difficult to reconcile this holding with the terms of the certificate of insur-
ance which provides "should the beneficiary named herein die before said
member, or should there be a failure of a proper designation of beneficiary,
then in all such cases the amount due upon the certificate shall be paid to the
person or persons who may be entitled thereto in order prescribed in the Con-
stitution of said brotherhood." This would seem to fit this case exactly and
imply that the naming of a new beneficiary after death of the first named
beneficiary would be a "change of beneficiary." Blume, J., writes a strong
dissenting opinion in the principal case and the weight of authority seems to
be with the dissenting opinion. Head v. Supreme Council etc., 64 Mo. App.
212 (1895) Modern Woodimen of America v. Puckett, 77 Kan. 284, 94 Pac.
132, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1083 (1908). The chief objection to the second
holding is that an insurance company would never know when it was safe to
pay out the amount of the policy, when the named beneficiary did not appear-
for at any time someone might claim to be the subsequently named beneficiary
and demand the money. G. DE G.
M UNICIPAL CORPORATIos-GovERxfETAL POWERa--PROPRIETAIY POWERS-
ULTIA ViEs Toas.-A municipal corporation authorized to operate "rail-
ways" operated a motor bus for profit on a route where it was impracticable
to extend the railway system. Through the negligence of the bus driver in
operating the bus, the plaintiff was injured. Hold. (Holcomb, J., dissenting)
The operation of the motor bus by the municipality being ultra aires, plaintiff's
action should be dismissed. Woodward v. City of Seattle, 40 Wash. Dec. 55, 248
Pac. 73 (1926).
A municipal corporation is generally not held liable for the negligence
of its servants in the performance of functions governmental in nature. The
rule is the same whether the injury is incurred in the performance of intra
vires or ultra vires acts. Jones v. City of Phoenix, 239 Pac. (Ariz.) 1030
(1925) Whiteside v. Benton County, 114 Wash. 463, 195 Pac. 519 (1921)
Seattle v. Puget Sound Light '& Power Co., 103 Wash. 41, 49, 174 Pac. 464
(1918) Cunningham v. Seattle, 42 Wash. 134, 84 Pac. 641 (1906) 19 R. C. L.
1137 28 Cyc. 1257. This view arises out of the theory of sovereign immunity.
SHEARM. & REDF., NEGLIGENCE (6th ed.) § 253; McQuiLLix, MUNICIPAL Coa-
RECENT CA8ES
ronRATios § 2623. And in the case of ultra vzres torts the additional rea-
son is invoked that the policy of the law will not permit a municipality to
assume powers and incur liabilities contrary to the intent of the legislature
and in violation of the rights of the inhabitants. 19 R. C. L. 1137, 28 Cc.
1257. The harshness of the rule has been severely condemned, and the tendency
bf the recent cases is towards a material modification of it. Note to Switzer
v. Town of Harrsonburg, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 910, 919; 24 Cor. L. REv. 679;
see also Edwin M. Borehard, Government Liability 2n Tort, 34 YALE L., J. 1,
129, 229.
The rule of non-liability with respect to governmental functions has, how-
ever, no application to the performance of non-governmental duties by the
mumcipality. Hence the same liability that would attach to a private corpora-
tion performing the same duties attaches to the municipal corporation. Stnck-
faden v. Green Creek Highway District, 248 Pac. (Idaho) 456 (1926), Norman
v. City of Chariton, 207 N. W (Iowa) 134 (1926) see also Whiteside v. Ben-
ton County, 114 Wash. 463, 195 Pac. 519 (1921) 19 R. C. L. 1109- 28 Cyc.
1258. Therefore, it is generally held that when a municipality engages in the
business of furnislung electricity, light, water, etc., it is not exercising govern-
mental functions, but proprietary powers, and is governed by the same rules
of law as are applicable to ordinary business corporations engaged in a like
business. Town of Athens v. Miller 190 Ala. 82, 66 So. 702 (1914), Pikes
Peak Power Co. v. Colorado Springs, 105 Fed. 1, 11 (1900), McQUILir,
MuxIcIPAL Conx'onATxoixs §§ 2680, 2681. The operation of a railway by a
municipality for profit is a non-governmental duty for which liability of a
private corporation should attach. Texas Employers' Ins. A.ssoctation -0. City
of Tyler, 283 S. W (Tex.) 9;29 (1926) Greene v. City of Amarillo, 244
S. W. (Tex.) 241 (1922), see McQuiLLI, MuicnAxT CoRonATioxs § 2685;
see also Asia v. Seattle, 119 Wash. 674, 206 Pac. 366 (1922). The right to sue
the Seattle Mumcipal Railway for the negligence of its servants is not even
questioned in this state. Boulton v. Seattle, 114 Wash. 234, 195 Pac. 11 (1921),
Hoopman v. Seattle, 122 Wash. 379, 210 Pac. 783 (1922). Although there is a
conflict of authority on the question, the sounder and prevailing view is that
the tort liability of a private corporation is the same whether the tort be com-
mitted in the exercise of powers intra vires or ultra vires. The corporation
having assumed to act is deemed to have assumed liabilities commensurate
with its acts. A contrary view would deprive an innocent tird party of a
remedy for damage sustained. Pronger v. Old National Bank, 20 Wash. 618,
622, 56 Pac. 391 (1899) 7 R. C. L. 684; 14A C. J. 769, 777.
In the principal case, it would seem that the mumcipality having assumed
to act in a proprietary capacity must be held to have assumed proprietary
liabilities. And since, in such a case, tort liability is recognized in the per-
formance of ultra wires acts, it would seem that the plaintiff's complaint
should not have been dismissed. See, however, City of Radford -V. Clark, 113
Va. 199, 73 S. E. 571, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 281 (1912), 19 R. C. L. 1138.
C. H.
SAxs-FRaD--ETrn xTs--ScemTT.-By contract defendants sold to the
plaintiff the right to manufacture and sell a patented gas producing plant
with the representation that the plants could be manufactured at a cost not
to exceed $250 and in an ordinary tin-shop. Plaintiff was compelled to pay to
a holder in due course a note given for the above right and here sues to recover
the amount so paid and other costs basing is action of fraud and deceit on
the above representations. Defendants contend on appeal mnter alia that
scienter is a necessary element in these cases, and that they did not know
that the above representations were false. Held: It is not necessary in order
to recover damages or to set aside a contract because of false representations
to show that the representations were knowingly, falsely made, but it is suffi-
cient to show that they were made as representations of fact, when the maker
was in fact without knowledge of their truth or falsity, even though made
innocently or believing them to be true. .acquot 'a. Farmers Straw Gas Pro-
ducer Co., 40 Wash. Dec. 368, 249 Pac. 984 (1926).
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A distinction is often made between an action at law for damages and a
suit in equity for rescission as to the necessity of averring and establishing
scienter. As a matter of defense in equity it is only necessary to prove the
misrepresentation, and a contract induced by a misrepresentation cannot stand
regardless of fraudulent intent and whether made innocently under misappre-
hension or mistake. Wezse v. Grove, 99 N. W (Iowa) 191 (1904) Grim v.
Byrd, 32 Gratt. (Va.) 300 (1879) Adams v. Reed, 40 Pac. (Utah) 720 (1895)
Kountze v. Kennedy, 41 N. E. (N. Y.) 414 (1895). See also cases collected in
note to McFerran v. Taylor in 1 Rose's Notes, 240. The test in such cases is
not whether the defendant knew the statement to be false but only that the
representation was false and actually misled the plaintiff. Kell v. Trenchard,
142 Fed. 16, 73 C. C. A. 202 (1905) and cases cited.
A few states apply this equity rule in an action at law and do not require
proof of scsenter at all to support an action for deceit. Magill v. Coffman,
129 S. W (Tex. Civ. App.) 1146 (1910) Gerner v. Mosher 78 N. V (Nebr.)
384 (1899).
The majority of the courts, however, in an action for deceit, require proof
of scienter that is, knowledge on the part of the maker of the falsity of his
representations, or what in law is eqmvalent to knowledge, Kimber v. Young,
137 Fed. 744, 70 C. C. A. 178 (1905) Kountze v. Kennedy, supra; Morrow V.
Franklin, 233 S. W (Mo.) 224 (1921) Whitmire v. Heath, 71 S. E. (N. C.)
313 (1911) Cobb v. Peters, 136 Pac. (Ore.) 656 (1913). This requirement as
to scienter may be satisfied either by showing (1) actual knowledge of the
falsity of the representation, L. C. G. Realty Co. v. Schlesinger-Gilman Constr.
Co., 164 N. Y. S. 694 (1917), or (2) untrue representations of own knowledge
having in fact no knowledge of the truth or falsity thereof, Bullitt v. Farrar
12 Minn. 8, 6 L. R. A. 149 (1889), Kerr v. Shurtleff 105 N. E. (Mass.) 871
(1914) Vincent v. Corbitt, 47 So. (Miss.) 641 (1908), even if believing them to
be true, Hadcock v. Osmer 47 N. E. (N. Y.) 923 (1897) or (3) false state-
ments when under a special duty to know the truth. Prewitt v. Trimble,
17 S. W (Ky.) 356 (1891) Hoock v. Bowman, 60 N. W (Nebr.) 389 (1891)
Morrow v. Franklin, supra; Starwich v. Ernst, 100 Wash. 198, 170 Pac. 584
(1918). The principal case falls clearly within the second class and states the
rule sustained by the weight of authority.
However, the principal case merely holds that the evidence was sufficient
to warrant the jury in finding that the untrue representations (being of facts
susceptible of knowledge and made with the knowledge that they were being
relied upon), were made as of the defendant's own knowledge when he had
in fact no knowledge of the truth or falsity thereof, and these representations
were sufficient to constitute fraud under the well settled law of this and other
states. Whether seznter must be shown in this state it was not necessary to
decide. The Washington Court has held, however, that to constitute actionable
fraud scienter must be pleaded, Northwestern S. S. Co. v. Dexter Horton Co.,
29 Wash. 565, 70 Pac. 59 (1902) Seribner v. Palmer 81 Wash. 470, 142 Pac.
1166 (1914), and proved. Jorgensen v. Albertson, 129 Wash. 686, 225 Pac.
639 (1924). In the principal case, Northwestern S. S. Co. vs. Dexter Horton
Co., supra, and Jorgensen v. Albertson, supra, relied on by the appellants, are
not discussed. The representations in the Northwestern S. S. Co. case have at
least been distinguished in Lawson v. Vernon, 38 Wash. 42-2, 80 Pac. 559
(1905) as statements of opinion as to the solvency of third persons. This
criticism of the Northwestern S. S. Co. case, supra, was approved in West v.
Carter 54 Wash. 236, 103 Pac. 21 (1909), but the holding in the Northwestern
S. S. Co. case, supra, has been approved since in Jorgensen v. Albertson, supra.
Under the holding in the Jorgensen case it would seem that sczenter is required
in Washington in an action at law based on fraud, but such knowledge may
be imputed where a material matter susceptible of knowledge, is represented
as a fact when the declarant has, in fact, no knowledge of the truth or falsity
thereof. W E. E.
